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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Zeti Akhtar Aziz
By Maryann Haggerty
Zeti Akhtar Aziz, a Malaysian economist, was governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, her nation’s
central bank, from 2000 to 2016; prior to that, she was acting governor and deputy governor.
Dr. Zeti was a key leader in Malaysia’s response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, as well
as the financial sector restructuring that followed. This “Lessons Learned” summary is based
on a 2022 interview with Dr. Zeti. At the time of the interview, she was co-chair of the board of
governors of the Asia School of Business in Kuala Lumpur, which is a partnership between Bank
Negara and the MIT Sloan School of Management. Dr. Zeti is a member of the YPFS Advisory
Board.
There are no one-size-fits-all solutions. Malaysia rejected the austere International
Monetary Fund (IMF) approach to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, choosing
currency controls instead. Despite criticism, its economy rebounded.
In mid-1997, a financial crisis that began in Thailand spread through the region, including
Malaysia. This was generally regarded as a currency crisis.
At the time, Dr. Zeti was the chief economist at Bank Negara Malaysia, and an assistant
governor covering the economic sector, monetary policy, reserve management, and money
market and foreign exchange operations. She also had oversight of the foreign exchange
administration. She said:
The volatile capital flows started around May [1997], when the Thai baht, the Thai
currency, was targeted as the market had assessed it to be overvalued. There were
therefore continuous speculative attacks on the currency, which was subsequently
felt throughout the region, including in Malaysia.
As liquidity tightened, following the outflows, our role [at the Bank] was to provide
liquidity. The currency had also begun to depreciate in a discontinuous manner,
meaning that there were abrupt changes in the trading range during that period of
time. And so, intervention operations were also undertaken to stabilize the currency
market.
Despite the currency crisis and a large pre-existing current account deficit, the Malaysian
economy remained strong through much of the year. Growth slowed from about 9%
annually—overheated in the eyes of some—to about 7%. By December, though, financial
institutions were feeling stress. “This financial stress followed the depreciation of the
currency and the collapse of the stock market, which fell by about 50% at that time,” Dr. Zeti
recalled.
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As the months of the new year passed, Malaysia faced pressure, especially from the IMF, to
manage the crisis by raising interest rates and taking other austerity measures. Thailand,
Indonesia, and South Korea agreed to an IMF bailout program, but Malaysia did not.
Tensions built in the Malaysian financial and political systems. In August 1998, the governor
and deputy governor of the Bank stepped down. Dr. Zeti was promoted to acting governor.
“And at that point in time, I would describe Malaysia was about to breach its tipping point,”
she recalled. “By this time, the currency had depreciated by about 32%. … The currency had
experienced wave after wave of depreciation. The stock market had also collapsed by about
70%.”
Days after her appointment, she announced that the government was imposing a set of
currency controls—an approach to the crisis far different from that in the rest of the region.
The Malaysian ringgit was non-internationalized, which prevented trading in the currency
in offshore currency centers that were a source of speculation. Currency was also made
subject to a 12-month holding period, meaning if the currency was in the country, it would
have to stay there for a year.
The Malaysian economy quickly bounced back, posting 6% growth in 1999. “Essentially it
was a V-shaped recovery,” Dr. Zeti said. The region’s other countries also recovered,
including those in the IMF program.
But, Malaysia’s approach was condemned by many in the international financial markets.
The main concern was that funds were trapped inside the country and counterparties were
not sure, despite assurances from the government, that they would be able to take the money
out of the country in 12 months. But Dr. Zeti strongly defends the controls as the right
solution for her country at the time and afterward. In response to critics at one conference
who said that Malaysia hadn’t needed the controls to manage the crisis, she responded:
I said, “Malaysia recovered at the lowest cost in the history of financial crises. The cost
of the crisis was something like less than 5% of GDP. That includes the fiscal cost, the
cost to labor dislocation, and other costs.” It was very low compared to the cost that
generations are still paying for in Korea, in Thailand, and in Indonesia. For them it
was somewhere between 30 to 40% of GDP. So, I said, “Surely this mattered.”
Don’t wait for a crisis to assess your vulnerabilities.
In the mid-1990s, before the crisis, the Malaysian economy was hot, with GDP growth of 910% and credit growth of 20-30%. The current account deficit was “massive,” Dr. Zeti said,
at about 10% of GDP. She said:
The argument made at that time was that Malaysia was receiving a significant inflow
of foreign direct investment during this period that covered this deficit. The economy
was viewed very positively. It was therefore highlighted that this deficit was being
financed by long-term foreign direct investment and not short-term inflows.
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But we did recognize at that time that this was an area of vulnerability and that it
posed a risk to our economy and to our financial system. Macroprudential measures
were thus aggressively implemented—although we were not clever enough to call it
that. But essentially that was what were implemented. It included placing limits on
lending to the property sector and the financing of activity in the stock market and so
on. There were other limits that were imposed on the portfolio of the banking
institutions aimed at reining in the excesses and risks to our financial system and to
our economy.
That paid off when things went bad. Dr. Zeti said:
The first lesson was the importance of determining and managing our areas of
vulnerability. For us, it was our huge current account deficit, the rapid credit growth,
and the rising domestic indebtedness. Policies were implemented during that time to
address these issues and it produced results. So, when we entered into the crisis, it
was at a much stronger position than the two years earlier, where we would have
been in a similar position as in Thailand that had these risks during the time of the
crisis.
Understand the nature of the crisis. In 1997-98, that meant understanding currency
markets.
The Asian financial crisis began with the Thai baht. But currency markets are international,
and contagion crosses borders. In 1997-98, the Malaysian ringgit came under repeated
attacks from speculators in international markets, Dr. Zeti said. Fighting contagion requires
knowing how those markets operate, she said, and what weapons a nation has in dealing
with attacks on its currency. She explained:
This crisis started as a currency crisis. It is therefore important to understand the
foreign exchange market, the dynamics of this market, that it is prone to
discontinuous adjustments, that it is prone to over-adjustment, and that it does not
have self-equilibrating forces to return it to levels where it would reflect the
underlying fundamentals of the economy.
In other words, during normal circumstances, when you are not in the crisis, the rates
are expected to return to levels where it reflects the underlying economic
fundamentals. During a crisis, however, it will tend to go further and further away
from its equilibrium point. It is also important to understand the role of the major
players in the market, including that of hedge funds—to understand how they take
positions on currencies and so on. I personally spent a lot of time in the dealing room
with the dealers, in particular at the ringgit desk. They engaged with the
counterparties who would inform them that they had orders to sell off the currency
at the various levels and at which rate. We could therefore see that they were dealing
with hundreds of millions and therefore, we knew that the resources that they had
far exceeded the resources that we had. We knew that we didn’t have that kind of
resources to defend our currency.
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And therefore, the lesson here is to understand the dynamics of the market, the
different behaviors of the various players in the market such as that of investors and
those such as hedge funds which produce different kinds of movements in the market.
Sometimes it would be futile, absolutely futile to defend a currency. You would in no
time deplete your reserves. And that is what brought a number of the countries to
eventually come under an IMF program.
Guarding the ringgit from continued speculation was a primary goal of the 1998 currency
controls, she said. It was a necessary step toward stabilizing the domestic economy and
financial system.
A nation must determine its own objectives and communicate them.
At one point, the IMF wanted Malaysia to raise interest rates by 5 percentage points, Dr. Zeti
said, and allow the currency exchange rate to adjust. “They said Malaysia had a relatively
strong economy, and so, the exchange rate would adjust right back to where it would reflect
the underlying fundamentals.”
But Malaysia believed the currency markets were “irrational,” she said, and would not reflect
fundamentals. It rejected the IMF’s ideas and did not raise rates. She recalled:
Of course, when Malaysia did not adopt the IMF prescriptions—this was even before
the controls were implemented—there was widespread condemnation. This was
mainly for not raising rates. The IMF made interventions at various international
meetings and issued press statements that Malaysia failed to raise interest rates and
that this was causing our currency to depreciate and so on. The condemnation by the
IMF and the international community was indeed very overwhelming for us. There
was not much we could do but to present our case. But it wasn’t listened to much. We
nevertheless continued to pursue our own policies that we assessed to be in the best
interest of our country. So that was our focus; we had very specific goals to achieve.
They were three-fold: to restore stability in our financial markets, to repair our
financial system, and to bring about an economic recovery.
Thus, we had three very specific objectives for our policies. There was therefore also
an important role for communications. Since we didn’t succeed in getting acceptance
from the international community, we focused on our domestic community. And this
was important because although Malaysia did have some domestic capital outflows,
there was no large-scale domestic capital flight. The role of communications is a very
important lesson. Information was provided on a daily basis to the financial industry,
to the businesses, and to the public at large about our policies, the rationale for these
policies, and our assessment of the impact of these policies.
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